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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a simple two-stage model of research and 
de velopment, in which the "winner" of the research stage has the 
option of moving first in the development stage. Some peculiar 
results emerge: in equilibrium, the leader in the development stage 
invests less than each follower, and is consequently least likely to 
collect the patent. Moreover, the leader receives a lower expected 
payoff than each of the followers. Thus there are endogenous second­
mover advantages. Using a game of timing (in which the identity of 
the Stackelberg leader is determined) to link the two stages, we find 
that firms face quite different incentives in the research stage. 
Although the leader invests less than each follower in the research 
stage as well, the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the 
complete (two-stage) game than does each follower. The equilibrium is 
inefficient because there is a lag between the time at which research 
is completed and the time at which development is begun, and because 
aggregate investment is inefficiently (asymmetrically) distributed 
across firms. 
A TWO-STAGE MODEL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
WITH ENDOGENOUS SECOND-MOVER ADVANTAGES 
Jennifer F. Reinganum 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is commonplace in informal discussion to distinguish two 
stages in the process of perfecting a new product or technology 
"research" and "development. " "Research" is frequently described as a 
relatively risky activity, whose results are generally unappropriable, 
while "development" consists of refining the results of research into 
a commercial, often patentable, product. We propose to develop a 
model of research and development which embodies the characterization 
above. We intend to analyze the possibilities for commitment 
generated by early research success or precedence with the original 
idea. For example, suppose that development can commence only upon 
successful completion of the research stage. Suppose in addition that 
research findings rapidly become common knowledge. Then the firm 
which succeeds first at research does not gain a perceptible "lead" on 
its rivals -- it possesses only one advantage -- it can "move first" 
in the development stage. That is, the winner in the research stage 
becomes {if it so chooses) a Stackelberg leader in the development 
stage. One of the more surprising results of this analysis is that 
the winner in the research stage will not choose to move first in the 
development stage. Although it prefers to be a leader than a Nash 
player, it would most prefer the role of follower. This implies that 
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the first successful researcher may decide to delay rather than to 
commit itself. Thus in order for the first successful researcher to 
prefer to move first in the subsequent development stage, it is 
necessary for early research success to confer a considerable 
advantage in the development stage (either by providing a substantial 
lead over rivals or by increasing the likelihood of development 
success) . 
The fact that each firm prefers to move "second" in the 
development stage necessitates the examination of an intervening game 
which determines the identity of the first mover {for simplicity, we 
lump all followers together) . Once equilibrium behavior is 
characterized at this level, we can consider the preceding (research) 
stage, again with the possibility that one firm, having first 
conceived the idea, may have "moved first" in the research stage. We 
find that the first mover in the research stage still invests less 
than each follower; however, the first mover receives a higher 
expected payoff than each follower. 
This equilibrium is inefficient for two reasons. First, there 
is no merit in the leader/follower structure. Coordinated investment 
would imply immediate, simultaneous investment. Instead the 
equilibrium is characterized by the firm with the initial idea moving 
first (rather than revealing the idea) ;  in the second stage, firms 
hesitate rather than beginning development immediately. Thus while 
new projects are researched promptly, they are not developed promptly, 
which is inefficient from either a joint profit maximizing or a 
welfare maximizing perspective. Second, there is no merit in the use 
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of different investment levels by the leader and the followers. Given 
the symmetry of the problem as posed, any particular expected date of 
completion is achieved at least cost by having all firms invest at 
equal rates. 
II. TIIE DEVELOPMENT STAGE 
In typical dynamic programming style, we consider the last 
stage first. In particular, suppose that firm 1 is a Stackelberg 
leader in the development stage, while firms 2 ,3, • • .  ,n+l are 
followers. Suppose that firm 1 has chosen to invest at the rate x1, 
implying a development intensity of h1 = h(x1) ,  where h(. ) is twice 
differentiable with h'(.) ) 0 and h''(. ) < O. The development process 
is assumed to be stochastic with the probability of success by firm i 
by time t equal to 1 - e 
-h.t 
1 , where h. = h(x.) is the development 
1 1 
intensity selected by firm i, at a cost of xi dollars per unit time. 
This is a sort of "putty-clay" model of development -- the firm 
selects a scale at which to run its project, which it must continue to 
maintain unless it succeeds or gives up entirely.1 
1. In this regard we follow Lee and Wilde (1980) rather than Loury 
(1979) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) . Once selected, the costs x. 
per unit time are fixed but not sunk. The constancy of the investmeft  
rate is assumed by Lee and Wilde (1980) . In Reinganum (1982 ) , it was 
shown that, in a purely Nash equilibrium context, allowing the 
investment rate to depend on time and a relevant state variable adds 
no generality when the hazard function h(.) depends only on current 
investment; in a stationary environment, a constant rate of investment 
will be an equilibrium strategy. This need not be true in the 
Stackelberg case; we specifically require constant investment by 
making this putty-clay assumption about the technology of the 
inventive process. 
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Successful development rewards the first successful firm with 
a patent of value P. Assuming that firm 1 has selected x1, firms 
2 ,3, . . •  ,n+l play a simultaneous-move game in which each acts as a Nash 
player. 
Definition 1. A strategy for firm j is a decision rule 
x. : [0,00) --7 [0,00) .  The expression x.(x1) represents the investment J J 
rate for firm j, conditional on that chosen by the leader, x1. 
Definition 2 .  The payoff to firm j which results from the development 
game is 
m 
t -(h(x.) + a.) t - [ -r J J V.(x.,a.) - e e [h(x.) P - x.]dt - K, J J J J J ( 1) 
where a. = 'f h(x.) and K is a fixed, nonrecoverable cost associated 
J ffj 1 
with development activity. 
That is, firm i collects the patent at t with probability 
-(h(x.) + a.) t 
density h(x.) e  J J -- this is the probability that j J 
succeeds at t and no other firm has yet done so. Firm j pays the 
development 
probability 
cost xj so long as no firm has yet succeeded -- with 
-(h(x.) + a.) t 
e J J • Integrating equation (1) above yields 
Vj(xj,aj) = [h(xj) P  - xjl/[r + h(xj) + aj] - K. (2) 
Suppose that there exist values of x. such that h(x.) P - x. ) O. Thus 
J J J 
there is at least a possibility of positive profit for firm j. 
Definition 3. A best response function for firm j is a decision rule 
<J. : [0, "") -7 [0, "") , where <J .(a.) represents the value of x. which J J J J 
maximizes V.(x., a.) . 
J J J 
That is, for each a., V.(<J.(a.) , a.) 2 V.(x., a.) 
J J J J J J J J  
for all x. e [0, "") .  
J 
Definition 4. A Nash equilibrium for the followers, given x1, is an 
n-tuple of strategies (µ2(x1) ,  • • . , µn+l <x1) )  such that 
µj (xl) = <Jj (h(xl) + . ) l h(µi (xl) ) )1fr , 
for all j = 2, 3, • • •  , n+l. 
Consider the first- and second-order necessary conditions 
which characterize a unique interior best response for firm j. 
avj<dj' aj) /axj 
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� (r + h(dj) + aj) (h'(dj) P  - 1) 
- (h(d.) P - d.) h'(d.) = 0, 
J J J (
3) 
which can be simplified to yield 
V. ( d. , a.) + K = ( h' ( d.) P - 1) /h' ( d.) • J J J J J (4) 
Since there exist values of x. which guarantee that h(x.) P - x. > 0, 
J J J 
it follows that V.(d., a.) + K > O. Thus h' (d.) P - 1 > O. J J J J 
Remark 1. h'(d.) P - 1 )  0 for all a. e [0, "") .  J J 
An alternative simplification of equation (3) yields 
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h'(d.) (rP + a.P + <J.) - (r + h(d.) + a.) J J J J J 
o. (5 ) 
The second-order necessary condition 
a2V.(Q'., a.) /ilx� = h''(d.) (rP + a.P + <J.) /(r + h(Q'.) + a.) 2 � 0 (6) J J J J J J J J J 
holds with strict inequality since h''(. ) < O. 
Lemma 1. d.(a) • <J.(a) • <J(a) for all j, i f 1. In addition, J 1 
<J'(a) > O. That is, the form of the best response function is the 
same for all the followers, and an increase in aggregate rival 
investment stimulates an increase in the best response of firm j. 
Proof. The first claim is apparent from the first-order condition (3) 
which implicitly defines the best response function. By the implicit 
function theorem, 
<J'(a) = -(h'(<J) P - l ) /h''(d) (rP + aP + <J) ) 0 
by Remark 1. 
If a Nash equilibrium exists, then 
µj (xl ) d(h(x1) + . ) _h(µi(x1) ) ) .1/'r , J 
O. E. D. 
Lemma 2. µjCx1) • µi(x1) s µ (x1) for all j, i f 1. That is, the form 
of the equilibrium decision rules is the same for all followers. 
Proof. Suppose µ.(x1) ) µ.(x1) .  Then a.(x1) < a.(x1) ,  where --- J 1 J 1 
a
j (x1)
Then 
h(x1) + k 
f" _h(µk(x1)) and ai(x1)fr, J h(x1) + f" _h(µk(x1)).kfr, 1 
µ
j(x1) 
= d(aj(x1)) 
< d(ai(x1)) 
= µi(x1)
,
which is a contradiction. 
1. 
Thus µ
j(x1) = µi(x1) e µ(x1) for all j, i  f 
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O.E.D. 
In what follows, we make use of the following modification of 
the Lee and Wilde (1980) stability condition for an n-firm Nash 
equilibrium. 
Assumption 1. Suppose that for all x1,
1 - d'(a(x1))(n - l)h'(µ(x1
)) > 0,
where a(x
1) = h(x1) 
+ (n - l)h(µ(x1)).
The content of Assumption 1 is that if all other Nash 
equilibrium players except firm j increase their investment by a fixed 
amount, then firm j's best response is to increase its own investment 
by less than that amount. To see this, suppose that every other 
(follower) firm increases its investment by dµ; x1 is regarded as
fixed throughout. Then rewrite the expression above as 
dd < da/(n - l)h'(µ). Since a= h(x1) + (n - l)h(µ),
da = (n - l)h'(µ)dµ. Substituting this for da above yields do< dµ. 
Lemma 3. Under Assumption l, µ'(x1) > 0. Thus the greater is the
investment rate of the leader firm, the greater is individual and 
aggregate follower investment. 
Proof. 
µ '(xl) d'(a(x1))(h'(x1) + (n - l)h'(µ)µ'(x1))
so 
µ'(x
1) = d'(a(x1))h'(x1)/(1 - d'(a(x1))(n - l)h'(µ(x1
))) > 0
by Assumption 1 and Lemma 1. 
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O.E.D. 
This characterizes the Nash equilibrium among the followers, 
Each follower firm invests more the greater is the aggregate 
investment by others (i.e., d'(,) > 0). Moreover, in equilibrium, 
each firm invests more the greater is the investment by the 
Stackelberg leader (i.e., µ'(.) > 0). 
Now consider the behavior of the leader. Firm 1 recognizes 
that its followers will each invest µ(x1) if it invests x1
•
Definition 5 .  A strategy for firm 1 is a number x1 e [0, oo). Firm l'
s
payoff is 
00 -rt -(nh(µ(x1)) + 
h(x1))tV1(x1) = Je e (h(x1)P - x1)dt - K 
= (h(x1)P - x1)/(r 
+ h(x1) + nh(µ(x1))) - K. (7) 
Firm 1 wishes to maximize its payoff, taking into account the 
dependence of its rivals' investment decisions upon its own strategy. 
In general, there is no need for this problem to be particularly 
well-behaved; however, we will proceed under the assumption that the 
solution can be characterized as an interior stationary point. The 
first-order necessary condition for an interior maximum is 
* * * * 
v
1•cx1
) � (r + h(x1) + nh(µ(x1)))(h'(x1
)P - 1)
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* * * * * 
- (h(x1
)P - x1)(h'(x1
) + nh'(µ(x1))µ'(x1
)) o. (8) 
Simplification of equation (8) yields 
* 
V
1Cx1
) + K 
* * * * 
(h'(x1
)P - 1)/(h'(x1
) + nh'(µ(x1))µ'Cx1)). (9) 
Again, firm 1 can guarantee that V1
Cx1) + 
K) 0, so the Remark below
follows. 
Remark 2. 
* 
h' ( x1) P - 1 
) 0.
Alternatively, equation (8) can be simplified to obtain 
* * * * * 
h'(x
1
)(rP + nh'(µ(x1))P + x1
) - (r + h(x1) + nh(µ(x1)))
* * * * 
(h(x1)P - x1
)(nh'(µ(x
1
))µ'(x1)) 
= 0. (10) 
The second-order necessary condition for an interior maximum, 
* 
that v
1••cx1
) � 0, is rather complicated, and will be assumed to hold
with strict inequality. 
Proposition 1. 
* 
xl < 
* 
x. 
J 
* 
µ(x1) for all jfl.
invests strictly less than each follower. 
Proof. Let
That is, the first mover 
g(x) 
* * * 
h'(x1)(rP + (n-l)h(µ(x1))P + h(x)P + x1)
* * 
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- h'(x)(rP + (n-l)h(µ(x
1
))P + h(x1
)P + x). (11) 
* * * * * * 
Note that g(x
1) 
= 0, while g(µ(x1)) 
= (h(x
1)P - x1)nh'(µ(x1
))µ'(x1) by
equation (10). Since there exist values of x such that h(x)P - x > 0, 
* * 
it follows that h(x
1
)P - x
1 
) O. 
g' (x) 
* 
h'(x)(h'(x
1)P - 1)
* 
Thus g(µ(x
1
)) > O. 
* * * 
h''(x)(rP + (n-l)h(µ(x
1
))P + h(x1
)P + x
1)
Moreover, 
(12) 
which is strictly positive by Remark 2 and the fact that h''(.) < O. 
* * * 
Thus x
1 < 
x
j = µ(x1).
Q. E. D. 
Thus the firm which moves first in the development phase is 
least likely to succeed first in the development phase, and is hence 
least likely to collect the ultimate reward. 
An even more surprising result is that, under the assumptions 
of this model, the firm which moves first has a lower expected profit 
than every firm which moves later. 
Proposition 2. Let VL and VF denote the equilibrium payoffs to the
leader and each follower, respectively. Then VL < VF.
Proof. 
L 
* * * * V = (h(x1)P - x1)/(r + h(x1) + nh(µ(x1
))) - K 
while 
.., * * * * = (h(µ(x1))P - µ(x1)}/(r + h(x1) + nh(µ(x1))) - K. 
L ./ * * * * Then V < if and only if h(x1)P - x1 ( h(µ(x1))P - µ(x1}. Since * * 
h'(x)P - 1 > 0 at both x1 and at µ(x1), and since h''(x) < 0, it * * 
follows that h'(x)P - 1 ) 0 for all x between x1 and µ(x1). Since * * * * 
x1 ( µ(x1) and h(x)P - x is strictly increasing on [x1, µCx1)], it * * * * L __ l/ follows that h(x1)P - x1 < h(µ(x1))P - µ(x1). Thus V < v-. 
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Q.E.D. 
This peculiar result is due to the fact that the first mover 
provides the followers with a public good -- by holding down its own 
development intensity, it reduces each follower's Nash rivals' 
intensities as well. This is quite the opposite result from the usual 
quantity-setting oligopoly equilibrium in which a Stackelberg leader 
is better off than the followers. They differ because an increase in 
aggregate output decreases the best response for each firm. Thus the 
incentives work in the opposite direction from those encountered in 
this model.2 It should be noted that the results described above are 
likely to be sensitive to the specification of R and D costs. For 
instance, in the models of Loury (1979) and Dasgupta and Stiglitz 
(1980), costs are lump-sum rather than in flow terms. Under this 
assumption, best response functions are decreasing at equilibrium; 
since a crucial element of the preceding analysis is the fact that 
best response functions are increasing, we might suspect different 
results under this alternative specification. However, the lump-sum 
cost formulation implies an even more extreme version of commitment; 
12 
once the level of investment is selected, all R and D costs are 
henceforth sunk. 
Using an assumption which is a slight extension of Assumption 
l, we can compare equilibrium investment in the leader/follower 
framework with symmetric equilibrium investment in a simultaneous-move 
framework. Let xN represent individual investment in a symmetric 
(n+l)-f irm Nash equilibrium. 
Assumption l'. Suppose that for all x1, 
1 - d'(a(x1))[h'(x1) + (n-l)h'(µ(x1))] > 0,
where a(x1) = h(x1) + (n - l)h(µ(x1)). 
Assumption l' can be interpreted much like Assumption 1: in 
this case, if all other firms except firm j (not just followers) 
increase their investments by the same amount, then firm j's best 
response is to increase its own investment by less than that amount. 
To formalize this notion, rewrite the condition above as 
2. In a labor market model with adverse selection, Weiss and Guasch 
(1980) derive the result that it is preferable to enter a labor market 
later rather than earlier. This is because less able workers accept 
the lower offers made by earlier firms, and thus a better average 
quality of worker remains for later firms. The result of the present 
paper is not due to adverse selection. Similarly, Hendricks (1982) 
and Sadanand (1982) also discover circumstances in which firms may 
prefer to move later rather than earlier; this is due to the fact that 
common uncertainty is resolved by the first mover (Hendricks), or is 
resolved between moves (Sadanand). Since ours is a deterministic 
model, the result is unrelated to the resolution of any form of 
uncertainty. This result is, however, similar to the equilibrium 
consequences of strategic pricing in differentiated-products 
oligopolies, and to the equilibrium outcomes in spatial models of 
electoral competition. 
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do< da/[h'{x1) + {n-l)h'(µ(x1))].
Now if all other players except firm j increase their investments by 
the same amount dx, then da = [h'(x1) + (n-l)h'{µ(x1))]dx. 
Substituting this expression for da above yields do < dx. 
Proposition 3. Under Assumption l', x; ( xN and µ(x;) ( xN. That is, 
each firm invests less in the leader/follower framework than in a 
symmetric (n+l)-firm Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. At a symmetric equilibrium, it must be that xN µ(xN). That 
is, firm 1 plays the same strategy as every other firm. From 
* * 
Proposition 1 we know that x1 ( µ(x1). Define the function 
* N a(x1) = x1 - µ(x1). Then a(x1) ( 0, a(x ) = 0, and 
a' (x1) 1 µ
, (xl) 
1 - o'(a(xa))h'(x1)/(l - o'(a(x1))(n-l)h'(µ(x1))) 
[l - o'(a(x1))[h'(x1) + (n-l)h'(µ(x1))1 ] / [l - d'(a(x1)(n-l)h'{µ(x1» ]· 
Both numerator and denominator are strictly positive by Assumption l '. 
* N * N Thus x1 ( x .  Moreover, since µ'(x1) > 0, µ(x1) < µ(x ). 
O.E.D. 
We know from previous work (see e.g., Lee and Wilde (1980), 
Theorem 2) that firms invest at inefficiently high rates in a Nash 
equilibrium. Thus the leader/follower structure may actually be 
welfare-improving relative to the symmetric (n+l)-firm Nash 
equilibrium. 
III. TIIE TIMING GAME 
The first successful researcher has the option to be a 
Stackelberg leader in the subsequent development stage. While this 
option is preferable to being just another Nash player, it is not 
preferable to being a follower. Let vN represent the Nash payoff in 
an n+l-firm simultaneous-move game. Then VF > VL > �. Thus the 
first successful researcher may elect to forego the option of going 
first, in the hope that some other firm will do so. 
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The fact that VF > VL > VN necessitates the analysis of a game 
which intervenes between the research and develpment stages; in this 
game, the timing of play is determined. That is, whether there is a 
leader/follower structure or a simultaneous-move structure. 
Notice that there is no point in delaying investment after the 
first mover has moved (assuming all followers move simultaneously). 
Thus all followers move simultaneously immediately after the first 
mover selects its investment. Thus the timing game essentially ends 
with the first move.3 
It is easy to show that there is no pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium in this game. For instance, there is no symmetric 
,. 
equilibrium, because suppose that everyone else plays "move at t if no 
one else has yet moved (and choose the n+l-firm Nash equilibrium 
3. Guasch and Weiss (1980) examine a two-firm timing game which is 
formally equivalent to this one (if we assume two firms rather than an 
arbitrary finite number). Thus the analysis of this section, though 
independently done, is only marginally more general than their work. 
The results are included to provide continuity and intuition for how 
the research and development stages are linked together by this 
intervening game of timing. 
investment level)." Then firm i's payoff if it moves at ti is
yLe
-rti A if t. < t 1 
J'e
-rti A if t. = t 1 
F -rt. A V e 1 if t. > t 1 
A A A 
Either ti = t + e or ti = t - e would be preferred to ti = t for
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sufficiently small e ,  since VF > VN and VL > VN. Thus there can be no
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. 
Now suppose that there is an asymmetric equilibrium, with firm 
i the leader. Let t_i be the time selected by everyone else. Then
-rt.
Firm i's equilibrium payoff is VLe 1ti < t-i' say t_i = ti + e . 
But since VF > yL, t. = t .1 -1
for sufficiently small e'. 
asymmetric Nash equilibrium. 
+ e• is strictly preferred to ti= t_i - e 
Thus ti < t_i can't be part of an
Since this argument works for all i, 
there can be no asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium, and hence no 
pure strategy equilibrium at all. 
There is, however, a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the 
space of continuously differentiable mixed strategies. To see this, 
let 1 - Fi(t) be the probability that i has not moved by t. This is
the planned distribution; once another firm actually moves, the 
followers all follow instantly. Thus the payoff to firm i when i uses 
Fi and the aggregate probability that none of the rivals has moved by
t is 1 - G(t), is 
16 
U.(F. ,G) 1 1 re-rt[VLf.(t)(l - G(t)) + �g(t)(l - F.(t))]dtn 1 1 (13) 
where F.(O) = 0, f.(t) L 0, lim F.(t) .{ l, and, similarly, G(O) = 0, 1 1 t -7"'1 
g(t) L 0, and lim G(t) .{ 1. That is, firm i selects its hazard 
t -7 "' 
rate, fi(t)/(1 - Fi(t)), which is its conditional probability density
of moving at t, given that it has not moved by t. The probability 
that it moves first at t is then this hazard rate times the 
probability that it has not yet moved, times the probability that no 
other firm has yet moved. This product is 
[fi(t)/(1 - Fi(t))](l - Fi(t))(l 
- G(t)), which simplifies to
fi(t)(l - G(t)), as in the first term of equation (13) above. The
second term represents the probability that some other firm moves 
first at date t, in which case firm i becomes a follower in the 
development stage. Using the calculus of variations, firm i chooses 
Fi(t) subject to the contraints on it, so as to maximize Ui, taking
G(t) as given. The Euler equation for this problem is 
-g(t)e-rt� d[e-rtyL(l - G(t))]/dt
or, performing the differentiation, 
g(t)/(l - G(t)) rVL/(� - yL). 
(14) 
(15) 
This ordinary differential equation has the unique solution 
G( t) 1 - exp{-[rVL/(VF - VL)]t} (16) 
through the point G(O) = 0. If we assume a symmetric equilibrium 
(i.e., F.(t) a F*(t) for all i), then 1 
1 - G*(t) (1 - F*(t))n exp{-[rVL/Cvf - VL)]t} .
Proposition 4. In a symmetric continuously differentiable mixed-
strategy equilibrium, each firm will randomize using an exponential 
distribution over the date of its move. 
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F*(t) 1 - exp{-[rVL/nCvf - VL)]t}. (17) 
It will follow this plan unless another firm moves first. If this 
occurs, it follows immediately. Thus the distribution of the date of 
the first move is exponential with parameter (n+l)rVL/nCvf - VL). The 
expected date of the first move is the reciprocal 
E[min{t.}] . 1 n(� - V
L)/(n+l)rVL. 
1 
This waiting game eventually ends, and a first mover is thus 
endogenously determined. Since the game is symmetric, all firms 
- * * ex� expect a payoff of V = Ui(F , G  ),
IV. TIIE RESEARCH PHASE
The payoff to successful research then is V. Moreover, this 
is received regardless of who succeeds first. This creates quite 
different incentives relative to the those of the development stage. 
Essentially the intervening "waiting game" smooths out any asymmetries 
in the subsequent payoffs. Suppose the technology for producing 
18 
likelihood of success at research is also exponential. Let A. = A(y.) J J 
be firm j's "research intensity, " sustained at a cost of y. dollars J 
per unit time. Then the probability that firm j successfully 
-A(y.)t 
completes research by time t is 1 - e J Suppose that A(.) is 
nonnegative and twice differentiable with A'(.) > 0 and A''(.) < O. 
Again there may be a "first mover, " a firm which first conceives of 
the idea, but which anticipates imitation or further entry into the 
research phase. " 
Then the payoff to each follower firm is 
m 
t -(A(y.) + b.)tW.(y.,b.) = fe-r e J J [(A(y.) + b.)V - y.]dt - C 
J J J  6 J J J (18) 
where b. = f" A(y.), and C is a fixed, nonrecoverable research cost.J f1;j 1 
Integrating equation (18) yields 
Wj(yj, bj) = [(A(yj) + bj)V - yjJ/Cr + A(yj) + bj) - c. (19) 
The definitions of a strategy, a best response and a Nash 
equilibrium for the followers, given y1, are analogous to those of
Section II. Let y.(y1) denote a strategy for firm j, f.(b.) j's bestJ J J 
response function, and (y.(y1))�
+
2
l a Nash equilibrium for the
J J= 
followers, given y1•
The first-order necessary condition for an interior best 
response for firm j is 
aW.Cf.,b.)/ay."' Cr + J..Cf.) + b.)(J..'(f.JV - 1) 
J J J  J J J J 
- c<J..<f .> + b.>v - iti.lJ..'<f.> = o J J J J 
which can be simplified to yield 
W.(f.,b.) + c = (J..'(f.)V - l)/J..'(f.).J J J J J 
Again, since there exist values of y. which ensure that 
J 
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(20) 
(21) 
J..(y.)V - y. ) 0, it follows that W.(f.,b.) + C > 0. Then we have the J J J J J 
following remark. 
Remark 3. )..'(f.)V - 1) 0. 
J 
Alternatively, we could rewrite (20) as 
J..'(f.)(rV + f.) - (r + J..(f.) + b.) = 0.J J J J 
The second-order necessary condition 
a2w.(f.,b.l/ai = J.."(f.)(rV + f.)/(r + J..(f.) + b.)2 � o 
J J J J J J J J 
holds with strict inequality since J..''(.) < O. 
Lemma 4. if.(.) • tp.(.) a f(.) for all i, j#l, and f'(.) < 0.J 1 
(22) 
That is, 
the best response function for the research phase is the same for all 
followers, and an increase in aggregate rival research results in a 
decrease in the best response of a given firm. 
Proof. The first claim is apparent from equation (20), which 
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implicitly defines f.{.). The second claim follows by the implicit J 
function theorem. Differentiating (20), we can solve for 
f'Cb . > = v/J.."<'P><rv + iti> < o. J 
Q.E.D. 
This is precisely the opposite result from the development 
stage, in which d'(a) ) 0. Now firms are indifferent about who 
succeeds first; they only prefer that success occur earlier rather 
than later. Thus the greater the investment undertaken by everyone 
else, the less firm j is willing to invest. 
As before, in a Nash equilibrium 
y.(yl) = f(J..(yl) + . } J..( yi(yl))). J 1/J, 1  
Assumption 2. Suppose J..''(y)(y + rV) + J..'(y) < 0 for all r e  [0,m).
Lemma 5. If Assumption 2 holds, then rj(yl) E ri(yl) E y(yl) for all 
i, jfl. That is, the Nash equilibrium is symmetric among the follower 
firms. 
Proof. Let 
g(y) J..'(y)(rV + r> - J..'Cr/ y1))CrV + r/ Y1» . 
By equation (22), g(yi(y1)) = 0, while g(yj(y1)) = 0 by inspection. 
Since g'(r) = J..''(y)(rV + r) + J..'(y) < 0, it follows that 
rj(yl) • ri(yl) & y(yl) for all i, j f 1. 
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Q.E.D. 
Lemma 6. y'(y1) < 0 for all y1• That is, the greater is the leader's
investment, the smaller is that of each follower. 
Proof. Recall that 
y(yl) = f(A(y1) + (n-
l)A(y(y1))).
Thus 
r'Cy1) = f'(b(y1))A'(y1)/(1  - f'(b(y1))(n-
l)A'(y)) < O 
since <p' ( • ) < 0. 
O. E. D. 
Again, this is quite opposite to the results obtained in the 
development stage. To summarize the research stage among the 
followers: each follower firm invests the amount y(y
1
) on research,
this amount being smaller the greater is y1•
Now consider the first mover's problem. As before the leader 
takes account of its impact upon the followers' subsequent decisions. 
Wl(yl)
oo -rt -(A(yl) + nA(y(yl))t - -
= [e e [A(y1)V + nA(y(y1)V - y1]dt - C 
= [A(y1)V + nA(y(y1))V - y1J/(
r + A(y1) + nA(y(y1))) - C. (23) 
A necessary condition for an interior maxiumum of W1 is
* * * * - * -
W1•(y1) "'(r + A(y1) + nA(y(y1))[A'(y1
)V + nA'(y)y'(y1)V - l]
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* - * - * * * 
[A(y1)V + nA(y(y1)V - y1](A'(y1) + nA'(y)y'(y1)) = O. 
(24) 
We can simplify equation (24) to obtain 
* *- * - * * W1(y1) + C = [A'(y1)V + nA'(y)y'(y1)V - 1]/(A'(y1) + nA'(y)y'(y1))
- * * 
= V - 1/(A'(y1) + nA'(y)y'(y1)).
Remark 4. Notice that since w1 + C < v, it is necessary that
* * 
A'(y1) + nA'(y)y'(y1) ) 0. 
Equation (24) may also be simplified to yield 
* - * * - * 
A'(y
1)(rV + y1) + 
nA'(y)y'(y1)(rV + y1)
* * 
- (r + A(y1) + nA(y(y1))) o. (25) 
Proposition 5. 
* * 
If Assumption 2 holds, then y1 < y(y1). That is, the
leader invests less than each follower. 
Proof. Let 
* - * 
g ( r) = A' ( y) ( rV + y) - A' ( y l) ( rV + Y l) •
* 
Inspection indicates that g(y1) = 0, while
* * - * 
g(y(y1)) = nA'(y)y'(y1)CrV + y1) < 0. Moreover,
g'(y) = A''(y)(rV + y) + A'(y) < 0, under Assumption 2.
* * 
Y1 < y(yl).
Therefore, 
O. E.D. 
Thus the leader still invests less than each follower. 
However, in the two-stage game, the leader is better off than each 
follower. 
Proposition 6. If Assumption 2 holds, then WL > WF. 
Proof. Using the definitions of the individual firm payoffs, it is 
L F * * clear that W ) W so long as y1 < y(y1). Proposition 5 says that 
this is true, if Assumption 2 holds. 
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Q.E.D. 
Again we can compare equilibrium investment in the 
leader/follower framework with that of an (n+l)-firm Nash equilibrium. 
Let yN denote this symmetric equilibrium rate of investment. 
Proposition 7. 
* N * N y1 < y and y(y1) ) y • That is, the leader invests 
less than it would in a Nash equilibrium, while each follower invests 
more than it would in a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof. At a symmetric (n+l)-firm Nash equilibrium, yN = y(yN). From 
* * 
Proposition 5, y1 < y(y1). Let �(y1) = Y1 - y(y1).
�(yN) = O, and �'(y1) = 1 - y'(y1) ) 0 since y'(y1) 
* N * N N Thus y1 < y • Since y'(_Y1) < 0, y(y1) > y(y ) = Y • 
* 
Then �(y1) < 0, 
< 0 by Lemma 6. 
Q.E.D. 
Again the analysis of the research stage differs from that of 
the development stage. In the development stage both leader and 
followers invested less than the symmetric Nash equilibrium investment 
rate, while in the research stage the leader invests less and the 
followers more than they would in a symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We have developed a simple two-stage model of research and 
development, in which the "winner" of the research stage has the 
option of moving first in the development stage. We have found that 
an increase in the rate of aggregate expenditure of rivals induces 
each firm to increase its (best response) rate of investment. We 
discovered the somewhat surprising result that, in equilibrium, the 
leader in the development stage invests less than each follower, and 
is consequently least likely to collect the patent. Moreover, the 
leader receives a lower expected payoff than each of the followers. 
Thus there are endogenous second-mover advantages.4 
Using a game of timing (in which the identity of the Stackelberg 
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leader is determined) to link the two stages, we have found that firms 
face quite different incentives in the research stage. In this stage, 
an increase in the rate of aggregate expenditure of rivals induces 
each firm to decrease its (best response) rate of investment. 
Although the leader invests less than each follower in the research 
stage as well, the leader enjoys higher expected revenue from the 
4. We also noted the likely sensitivity of this result to at least 
two of our assumptions. First, if the R and D costs are of the lump­
sum variety, it may be that committing a large investment makes 
follower firms invest less (because best response functions are 
decreasing at equilibrium with lump-sum costs). Second, we assumed 
that the first successful researcher is no more efficient at R and D 
and enjoys essentially no head start on development. It seems clear 
that advantages of sufficient magnitude in either of these directions 
will make it preferable to lead than to follow. 
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complete (two-stage) game than does each follower. 
The equilibrium described above is manifestly inefficient from 
the perspective of joint profit maximizing (or welfare maximizing, if 
the patent value is regarded as the social value of the innovation). 
First, there is no merit in the leader/follower structure. If firms 
are coordinating their investment, they may as well invest 
simultaneously. In the second stage, noncooperative firms hesitate 
rather than beginning development immediately. This hesitation is 
inefficient and would be eliminated by cooperative firms. Thus the 
noncooperative leader/follower structure means that new projects are 
researched promptly, but they are not developed as promptly as one 
would desire. Second, there is no virtue in the use of different 
investment levels by the leader and the followers. The time till 
completion is determined solely by the aggregate hazard rate; given 
the symmetry of the problem as posed, any particular aggregate hazard 
rate is achieved at least cost by having all firms invest at equal 
rates. 
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